![]() As to the proportionality of the measure to this aim, the majority noted that life imprisonment is imposed only in severe cases and is never a mandatory sentence (§§ 71-75). The majority accepted as legitimate the aim put forth by the Government, namely the promotion of “the principles of justice and humanity which required that the sentencing policy take into account the age and ‘physiological characteristics’ of various categories of offenders” (§ 70). The question, then, was whether the measure was proportionate to a legitimate aim. Examining the merits of the complaint under Article 14 taken together with Article 5, the majority held that there had indisputably been a difference in treatment between persons in analogous positions on the basis of sex and age (§ 69). The Grand Chamber applied its existing case-law to find that, while Article 5 ECHR does not preclude the application of a life sentence, the case fell within the ambit of the provision (§§ 53-60, citing Vinter and Others v. The Merits of the Grand Chamber’s Judgment The NGO argued that paternalistic, stereotyped or generalized measures were inappropriate and that, according to the principle of not ‘leveling down’, simply removing the exemptions would not remedy the situation: only an individualized assessment of the appropriate sentence for particular offenders would serve that purpose. ![]() ![]() Neither was it established that that a blanket exemption of persons over the age of 65 represented a proportionate way to avoid unduly harsh punishment. The NGO Equal Rights Trust intervened as a third party, arguing that the domestic measure impermissibly discriminated on the basis of age and gender and did not represent acceptable “positive discrimination” given that it “was not temporary and did not pursue any objective linked to the equality of opportunity or treatment” (§ 50). The case was relinquished to the Grand Chamber on 1 December 2015. Crucially, in its submissions to the Court, the respondent Government stated that it understood the applicants’ claims as seeking the end of age- and gender-related exemptions from life sentences (thus, a ‘leveling down’ of protection), as opposed to the abolishment of such sentences altogether (‘leveling up’) (§ 42 of the judgment). Before the Court, the applicants – who are both serving life sentences – argued under Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), taken in conjunction with Article 5 ECHR (right to liberty and security), that they had suffered discrimination on the basis of age and gender vis-à-vis groups who were legally exempted from life imprisonment. The Russian Criminal Code, in its Article 57 § 1, provides for the imposition of life imprisonment for certain crimes in its § 2, the provision prohibits the application of such punishment on women, juveniles and persons over the age of 65. When reading the judgment and separate opinions, it emerges that the Court failed to find that gender discrimination had taken place for a very specific reason: doing so would have brought about the (re-)introduction of life imprisonment for the excepted groups. The Grand Chamber was divided, and ultimately found no violation of the Convention in the case. The case concerned the alleged discrimination inherent in the fact that life imprisonment in the respondent State can only be imposed on men between the ages of 18 and 65. ![]() Is it permissible for States to categorically exempt women, juveniles and the elderly from being sentenced to life in prison? How should the Court handle the threat that States will ‘level down’ protection after it finds that a given measure is discriminatory? Those were the questions facing the Court’s Grand Chamber as it reached its judgment in Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v.
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